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The aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis still appear in the headlines most recently the government's quest to crush Moodys and S&P for failure to rate securities correctly given the risk. Were these agencies the only responsible parties? “To me, as a multi-decade, veteran Lehman investment banker, the breathtaking death of my firm appeared impossible as little as three days ahead of the bankruptcy filing. Not only did I consider our ‘master of the universe’ firm invincible, but, like my colleagues, when it became clear we were in deep trouble, it was unfathomable that the US government could misstep so foolishly as to let any bulge bracket investment bank simply fail. The worst case seemed to be the Bear Stearns route.” For the first time, Joe Tibman pulls back the kimono to share intriguing information and detail about Lehman Brothers and the economic meltdown that has never before been revealed: • How Lehman Brothers almost went under 10 years earlier but was, in a lucky turn of events, rescued from the brink of disaster when the U.S. government bailed out Mexico before it defaulted on billions of dollars in bonds? • How, in the most detailed and intimate account of Lehman after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, when the firm and its people were ripped from their home, Fuld’s “One Firm” strategy finally took root, sweeping away the vestiges of internal war inside Lehman’s own halls, turning tragedy to triumph for a newly united firm where survival and success meant much more than a payday? • What role did Paulson play? Cox? Bernanke? Greenspan? Geithner? Clinton? Phil Gramm? Congress? Summers? • No reporter has ever been able to uncover why the rating agencies rated subprime securities so high. These agencies have never come clean with a clear statement on this issue. They just fired subprime analysts. For the first time in this book, Tibman discloses the key facts behind the subprime rating disaster.